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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Ann. (1992).

This

is an appeal from final judgment, dated May 27, 1992, of the
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah.
Notice of Appeal was filed June 16, 1992.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE I
DID THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATE HIS DISCOVERY OBLIGATION UNDER
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BY FAILING TO PROVIDE THE
VIDEOTAPE TO THE DEFENSE IN A TIMELY MANNER?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There is no dispute as to the facts underlying this issue.
Therefore, the question whether the prosecutor's actions violated
Rule 16 of the rules of criminal procedure is a question of law.
The trial court's conclusions of law are accorded no deference
but are reviewed for correctness.

Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788,

790 (Utah 1990).
ISSUE II
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ADMITTING THE VIDEOTAPE INTO
EVIDENCE AND DID THIS ERROR PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANT'S CASE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's denial of a request for relief under Rule
16(g) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
v. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913, 918-19 (Utah 1987).
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State

STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 76-10-503. Possession of a dangerous weapon -- Persons
not permitted to have -- Penalties.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony or
is incarcerated in a correctional facility may not have in his
possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon
as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third
degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm,
explosive, or infernal machine he is guilty of a second degree
felony.
Section 76-1-601.

Definitions.

(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the
item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item
leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any
other manner that he is in control of such an item.
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose
to the defense upon request the following material or information
of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or
codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced
punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as
practicable following the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing
duty to make disclosure.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 920388-CA

PATRICK ARCHULETA,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Sixth
Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah.

The

defendant, Patrick Archuleta, was convicted of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (1992).

(Transcript of Sentencing

Proceeding, hereinafter "Tr." at 221-22.)

Defendant appeals the

conviction on the grounds that the trial court improperly
admitted a videotape into evidence and allowed it to be shown to
the jury.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The incident which gave rise to the charge occurred November
9, 1991 at the Central Utah Correctional Facility.

Patrick

Archuleta and another inmate refused to return to their cells and
were involved in a disturbance which lasted between an hour and a
half and two hours.

(Tr. at 71-100.)
6

Prison security personnel

recorded the incident on a video camera.

(Tr. at 163.)

On February 14, 1992, Defense Counsel filed a request for
discovery which specifically requested the videotape.
158.)

(Tr. at

The tape was not delivered to Defense Counsel until

Tuesday, May 5, 1992.

(Tr. at 159.)

Furthermore, the defendant

was not allowed to view the videotape until 9:00 p.m. on
Saturday, May 9, 1992--only 3 6 hours before the trial began.
(Tr. at 158.)

This left the defense with insufficient time to

prepare to counter the videotape at trial.
At trial, which was held on Monday, May 11, 1992, the
prosecution offered the videotape into evidence.
The defense objected for two reasons.

(Tr. at 157.)

One objection was that the

videotape had not been provided as requested in the discovery
request.

The other objection was that the portion of the tape

which was to be shown to the jury had a seven minute gap.
at 157-60.)
objection.

The trial court admitted the tape over the
(Tr. at 161.)

7

(Tr.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. THE PROSECUTOR IN THIS CASE VIOLATED HIS DISCOVERY OBLIGATION
BY FAILING TO PROVIDE THE VIDEO TAPE TO THE DEFENSE IN A TIMELY
MANNER.
The prosecutor's failure to comply with the defendant's
motion for discovery in this case violated the rules of criminal
procedure and impaired the adversary process.

The videotape at

issue is a recorded statement of the defendant which, under the
rules of criminal procedure, must be disclosed by the prosecutor
upon request.

Furthermore, when the prosecution chooses to

respond voluntarily to a discovery request without requiring the
defense to obtain a court order, fairness requires that the
prosecution must respond to the request in a manner that will not
be misleading and must produce all of the material requested or
identify explicitly those materials that will not be provided.
The prosecutor's delay in this case denied the defendant and
his counsel the opportunity to discuss the contents of the tape
and prepare to counter the evidence.

In fact, the defense could

have reasonably assumed that the videotape would not be offered
into evidence because it had not been delivered in response to
the discovery request.

The prosecution must comply when a

request for discovery is made.

This ensures that the trial is a

real quest for truth and not simply a contest between the parties
to win.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE VIDEOTAPE AND THIS
ERROR PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT'S CASE
When the trial court learned that the prosecution had failed
8

to comply with the criminal discovery rule, it could have
prohibited introduction of the evidence not disclosed or it could
have taken other remedial measures to mitigate any prejudice to
the defendant.

The trial court's failure to exclude the

videotape or to take any other remedial measures constitutes an
abuse of discretion warranting reversal.

It is likely that the

remedial measures requested but refused would have led to a more
favorable result for the defendant.
In the case at the bar the defense was impaired by the
prosecutor's failure to provide the tape within a reasonable time
before trial.

The defense did not have adequate time to prepare

to rebut or explain the information presented in the tape. In
cases involving a wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory
evidence, the burden is on the State to persuade the appellate
court that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense. The
State cannot meet that burden in this case.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR IN THIS CASE VIOLATED HIS DISCOVERY OBLIGATION BY
FAILING TO PROVIDE THE VIDEO TAPE TO THE DEFENSE IN A TIMELY
MANNER.
The prosecutor's failure to comply with the defendant's
motion for discovery in this case violated the rules of criminal
procedure and impaired the adversary process.

According to Rule

16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure the prosecutor has an
obligation to comply with the defendant's motion for discovery.
The rule states in the pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall
disclose to the defense upon request the following
material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of
the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense
for reduced punishment;
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made available
to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a) (emphasis added).
The material requested in this case is covered by the
description in subsection (a)(1).

The defense moved for

discovery of a videotape, made by prison officials, of the
disturbance which occurred at the prison.

Because the videotape

recorded the actions of the defendant and was proffered to
support the contention that he had possession of a dangerous
weapon, it is a "relevant . . . recorded statement of the
10

defendant."

Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1).

Rule 16 mandates that

the prosecutor disclose this recorded statement upon request.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a).
If the requested videotape is not covered by subsection
(a)(1), it is covered by the catch-all provision, subsection
(a)(5).

Although the catch-all provision requires disclosure

only to the extent ordered by the court, the Utah Supreme Court
has ruled that "when the prosecution chooses to respond
voluntarily to a request under subsection (a)(5) without
requiring the defense to obtain a court order, considerations of
fairness require that the prosecution respond to the request in a
manner that will not be misleading."
913, 916 (Utah 1987).

State v. Knight. 734 P.2d

One of the requirements imposed when the

prosecution voluntarily responds to a subsection (a)(5) request
is that "the prosecution must produce all of the material
requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the
request with respect to which no responsive material will be
provided."

Id. at 916-17.

Therefore, regardless of whether the

videotape is classified as a relevant recorded statement or as
other evidence under the catch-all provision, the prosecutor had
a duty to comply with the discovery request and disclose the
requested materials by providing the videotape to the defendant.
When responding to a discovery request, the prosecutor is
required to "make all disclosures as soon as practicable
following the filing of charges and before the defendant is
required to plead."

Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b).
11

It is clear from

the record that the prosector failed to meet his discovery
obligation in a timely manner.

The videotape was requested by

defense counsel on February 14, 1992 but was not delivered until
Tuesday, May 5, 1992.

(Tr. at 158-59.)

The unfairness of the

situation is compounded by the fact that the defendant, who was
incarcerated at the state prison, was not allowed to view the
tape until 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 9, 1992--only thirty-six
hours before the trial began.

(Tr. at 158.)

The defendant had

virtually no opportunity to confer with his attorney about the
contents of the tape and thus the defense was denied sufficient
time to explore ways of countering the tape.

The Utah Supreme

Court commented on a similar situation stating, "[s]ince defense
counsel only had one evening and a lunch break to prepare to meet
the . . . testimony, we are not persuaded that defense was as
effective as is would have been if defense counsel had been
granted a continuance to meet the undisclosed evidence."

State

v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 922 (Utah 1987).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE VIDEOTAPE AND THIS ERROR
PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT'S CASE.
When the trial court learns that a party has failed to
comply with the criminal discovery rule, it may prohibit the
party from introducing the evidence not disclosed.
P.

16(g).

Utah R. Crim.

The trial court has ample discretion to obviate or

remedy any prejudice to the defendant resulting from a breach of
Rule 16.

State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 1989);

Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 1987).
12

State v.

In the case at bar the

trial court admitted the videotape into evidence over the
defendant's objection even though the prosecutor had not complied
with the criminal discovery rules. The trial court's failure to
exclude the videotape or to take any other remedial measures
constitutes an abuse of discretion warranting reversal because
"the prejudice to the defendant satisfies the standard for
reversible error set forth in Rule 30, and the remedial measures
requested but refused would have obviated this prejudice."
Knight. 734 P.2d at 918.
Rule 30 provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded."

Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).

The Utah Supreme

Court has ruled that "the phrase 'affect the substantial rights
of a party' means that an error warrants reversal only if a
review of the record persuades the court that without the error
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
the defendant."

Knight, 734 P.2d at 919 (citations omitted).

In State v. Knight, the Utah Supreme Court carefully
analyzed the meaning of the "reasonable likelihood" standard.
Id. at 919-21.

The court concluded that "for an error to require

reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."

Id.

at 920. The court explained further that when considered against
"a spectrum of probabilities" where "a 'mere possibility' [of a
different result] is at the low end of the spectrum, 'near
certainty' is at the high end, and 'more probable than not' is a
13

likelihood greater than fifty percent", the likelihood of a
different result which would undermine confidence in the verdict
"is certainly above the 'mere possibility' point on the spectrum"
but is "at some point substantially short of the 'more probable
than not' portion of the spectrum."

Id.

Additionally, the court held that "in cases involving a
wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, it seems
appropriate . . . to place the burden on the State to persuade a
court that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense."
Id. at 921. The burden is placed on the State because when the
prosecution fails to disclose inculpatory evidence, the record is
silent as to the "nature and magnitude of the resulting prejudice
to the defense."

Id. at 920. The court stated:

The record cannot reveal how knowledge of this evidence
would have affected the actions of the defense counsel,
either in preparing for trial or in presenting the case
to the jury. To a large extent, this leaves the
reviewing court to speculate whether, absent the error
there is a reasonable likelihood that the defense would
have adduced other evidence which, when considered in
light of the evidence actually presented, would have
produced a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt.
Knight, 734 P.2d at 920.
In the case at the bar the defense was impaired by the
Prosecutor's failure to provide the tape within a reasonable time
before trial.

The defense did not have adequate time to prepare

to rebut or explain the information presented in the tape. If
defense counsel had been able to converse with the defendant
about the contents of the tape they may have discovered and
emphasized inconsistencies between the tape and the guards'
14

testimony.
For example, the tape apparently recorded none of the
threats to which the guards testified.

(Tr. at 175). One of the

key issues in this case was whether the broomstick, which was
issued to the prisoners by the prison authorities, was
dangerous weapon.

(Tr. at 93-97, 111-14, 152-53.)

a

A dangerous

weapon is defined as "any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury . . . and the actor's use or apparent
intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1992).

With adequate time to

prepare and review the contents of the tape the defense may well
have persuaded the jury that the broomstick was not a dangerous
weapon.
A trial should be a real quest for the truth and not simply
a contest between the parties to win.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d

663 (Utah 1985). The fairness and integrity of this trial were
tainted because the prosecutor chose to withhold evidence from
the defense.

Even if the defense knew that the videotape

existed, it could reasonably have concluded that the tape was not
going to be used at trial because the prosecutor was so late
complying with the discovery request.

Furthermore, it seems

inherently misleading that the portion of the tape shown to the
jury had a seven minute gap.

It is reasonably likely that the

outcome of the trial would have been different if the videotape
was excluded or if the trial court had taken other remedial
15

measures to mitigate prosecutor's delinquent disclosure of the
evidence.
The conviction must be reversed.

The admission of the

videotape into evidence has so eroded the integrity of the trial
that the outcome merits no confidence.
CONCLUSION
The prosecutor violated his discovery obligation when he
failed to provide the videotape to the defense in a timely
manner.

Because the prosecutor violated the rules of criminal

procedure, the trial court erred when it admitted the videotape
into evidence despite an objection by the defense.

The

conviction must be reversed because it is likely that the outcome
of the trial would have been different if the videotape had been
excluded.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul R. Frischknecht
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 7 6-10 5C '
.-.-•-MM.
.
rsons
not permitted tc , ~
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(2) (a) Any person A.I J S • . paioK* .,i p : ,OciM ^. for a L t=. ..u> -r
is incarcerated in a correcti.K.u facility may not have in his
possession or under his custody ^r centre" any dangerous wea^ :.
as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this sect, or: i.s guilty of a third
degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is i firearm
explosive, or infernal marhinp Y>& -i ~- -r;:" — ••
sec. ;id degree
felony.
Section 7 6-1-601.

i

(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable cf causing deatn or
serious bodily i njury, or a facsvmi"!e p r e s e n t a t \ ?::
item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended *se c* "h- item
leads the victim to reasonably believe the iten, - . i-- \r ^^
cause death or serious bodily injury; or
b; the actor represents to the victim v e r b a l ! / r ..:
2
• ' h-r manner that h° M !^s -,;.*
c * .-/:,. .ii: /.-;ri
OF' CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
<- - . -

discovery.

., ,;

ia, except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose
ro the defense upon request the following m a t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ rfnvT.at:: "^
.'r wt: -:h he has knowledge:
\1) relevant written or recorded statements ui . :.*
defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; '
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or
codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecute: that tends tv. ne^a^:
the guilt of the accused, mitigate rthe guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degrpp - - - '*•-- - "f^n?-^ f- _.• .
punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as
practicable following the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead,. The proseci itor has a continuing
du t y t o ma k e d i s c 1 o s u r e

(g) If at any time during the course of the proceeding it is
brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to
comply wit! this rule, the court may order such party to permit
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the
party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

Rule 5 0, Errors and defects•
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of
the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such
notice, it any, as the court may order.

